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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, of the Constitution of Utah,
section 78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code (1953, as amended), and
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and 4(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

AND STANDARDS QF REVIEW
Issues
1.

Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Motion

for Reconsideration?
2.

Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Motion

for Directed Verdict?
3.

Did the jury err in finding that plaintiff's refusal to

accept an application for residency from Jackie Southworth was
not an "unreasonable withholding" of approval for residency
within the meaning of section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code?
4.

Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's Motion

for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs.
5.

Did the trial court err in denying defendants' Motion

for Costs and Attorney's Fees?
Standards of Review
Issue ttl: A trial court's decision to grant or deny a
motion for reconsideration is within the trial court's

1

discretion, and an appellate court will not disturb the trial
court's ruling absent an "abuse of discretion."

See Lund v.

Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997)(motion to reconsider summary
judgment) (citation omitted); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381,
1386 (Utah 1996)(motion to reconsider summary judgment)
(citations omitted).

A trial court abuses its discretion if

there is "no reasonable basis for the decision."

Crookston v.

Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993) (citation
omitted).
In determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion, the appellate court will review the entire record.

See, e.g., J.V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 11
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (looking to entire record to determine
whether defendant's motion for reconsideration was properly
before trial court); Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d
650, 655 (Utah 1994) (deferring to entire record, which included
plaintiffs' complaint and affidavits supporting their motion for
reconsideration).

Thus, even if the motion for reconsideration

provides inadequate justification for upholding the trial court's
ruling, the ruling will be upheld if the record provides a
"reasonable basis" for doing so.
The trial court has "a great deal of latitude in determining
the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court business."
2

Morton v, Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997).
Absent a trial court ruling that is "so unreasonable that it can
f

be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of
discretion,'' an appellate court will not reverse the ruling.
Kunzler v. Q'Dell,855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation
omitted); see also Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. App.
1993)(applying "abuse of discretion standard")(footnote &
citation omitted).
Issue #2: The standard of review on appeal from a motion for
directed verdict is "correctness."

Management Comm. of Graystone

Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc. 652 P.2d 896,
897-98 (Utah 1982) .
Issue #3:

In reviewing a jury verdict, "[the appellate

court] view[s] the evidence in the light most supportive of the
verdict, and assume[s] that the jury believed those aspects of
the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment."

Billings

v. Union Rankers, Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996)
(internal quotations & citation omitted) .

In so doing, "the

[appellate court] will upset a jury verdict only upon a showing
that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the
appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome
of the case."

Id. (Internal quotations & citations omitted); &££

also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah
3

1982)(stating that appellate court should uphold jury verdict
unless jury's finding is "so plainly unreasonable as to convince
the court that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could make
[such a] finding.") (Citation omitted); see generally, Ortiz v.
Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1216 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (discussing standard of review for overturning a jury
verdict) .
Issue #4 and #5:

An appellate court reviews a trial court's

conclusions of law for "correctness."

See State v. Pena, 869

P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (stating that "appellate review of a
trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized
by the term 'correctness.'").
ISSUES PRESERVED FOR REVIEW QN APPEAL
Issue #1, #2 and #4:

Plaintiff now appears to make a claim

for ill attorney's fees incurred in defending against the
Counterclaim.1

Plaintiff did not preserve this issue for appeal

since, in its Motion for Allowance of Attorney's fees and Costs,
plaintiff only sought attorney's fees for defending against
certain portions of the Counterclaim.
x

(R. at 1103, 1148.)

See Brief of Appellant at 23, Brookside Mobile Home Park,
Ltd. v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Ct. App. filed Feb. 14, 2000)
(stating that "Brookside is entitled to its court cost and
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this action because
without exception, each and every one of the claims pursued by
Peebles at trial were based upon the Peebles' allegations that
Brookside violated the Utah Mobile Home Residency
Act.").
4

Issue #3 and tt5: Defendants preserved their right to appeal
the jury verdict by presenting their counterclaim to the jury.
(Trial Transcript [hereinafter "T"] at 284-721.)

When the court

reduced the jury verdict to a Judgment on May 26, 19 99, that
judgment became a final judgment subject to appeal.
99.)

(R. at 12 97-

Defendants preserved the right to appeal their Motion for

Attorney's Fees and Court Costs at the time it was filed.

(R.

1161-1162.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Brookside Mobile Home Park (the "Park") is a mobile

home park located at 8155 South 1700 West, West Jordan, Salt Lake
County, Utah.
2.

(R. at 1-2.)

In 1983, Sam Peebles purchased a double-wide mobile

home (the "Mobile Home") that was located on space #100 within
the Park.
3.

(T. at 400.)
Sam Peebles and Harold Peebles are listed on the title

as the owners of the Mobile Home.

(T. at 400; Exhibit D-71,

attached hereto as Appendice A.)
4.

Citicorp Acceptance Company, Inc. ("Citicorp") financed

the purchase of the Mobile Home, and is listed as the
"Lienholder" on the title to the Mobile Home.

(T. at 400-01;

Exhibit D-71, attached hereto as Appendice A.)
5.

Harold Peebles is Sam Peebles' father, and he co-signed
5

on the loan with Citicorp.
6.

(T. at 400-01.)

At the time he purchased the Mobile Home, Sam Peebles

signed a written lease with the owner of the Park.
7.

(T. at 402.)

From approximately 1983 until approximately 1987, Sam

Peebles and his wife and children resided in the Mobile Home.
(T. at 175. )
8.

After Sam Peebles moved out, he sold the Mobile Home on

an installment contract to Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock.

(T. at

175-456. )
9.

After about six months, Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock

defaulted on the contract and Sam Peebles retook possession of
the Mobile Home.
10.

(T. at 403.)

After retaking possession of the Mobile Home, Sam

Peebles signed a second lease with the owner of the Park.

(T. at

403 . )
11.

Thereafter, Sam Peebles subleased the Mobile Home to a

series of sublessees, including Yolanda Gonzales, Tim and Kathy
Burgess, and Richard and LaDawn Rowley.2
2

(T. at 189, 411-12.)

Plaintiff's representation that "Peebles . . . sold the
home to Richard Rowley" is incorrect. Brief of Appellant at 6,
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Ct.
App. filed Feb. 14, 2000). Sam Peebles subleased the Mobile Home
to Richard Rowley. See Q: "[D] id you have an arrangement
[with Richard Rowley]?" Sam Peebles: "He just rented it." (T.
at 183, line 22-23.) Q: "Did you ever sell the Mobile Home to
Richard Rowley?" Sam Peebles: "No I didn't." (T. at 412, line 810.) Q: "Did you sell your home to Richard Rowley?" Sam
6

12.

On or about December 9, 1994, the Park was sold to the

Alan H. Glover & Bonnie A. Glover Revocable Trust (the "Trust")
which subsequently transferred its interest to Brookside Mobile
Home Park, Ltd. ("Brookside").
13.

(T. at 34-35, 40-41.)

In connection with the sale, the Trust entered into an

Assignment of Lease and Deposits, dated December 9, 1994 (the
"Assignment").
14.

(T. at 34-35; Appendice B, attached hereto.)

Under that Assignment, the previous owner of the Park

transferred to the Trust "all of its right, title and interest in
and to" "those certain leases [and] rental agreements appurtenant
to the property."
15.

(R. at 469; Appendice B, attached hereto.)

The Assignment did not list the specific leases or

rental agreement that were transferred under the Assignment.

(R.

at 469-476; Appendice B, attached hereto.)
16.

Exhibit "B" to the Assignment listed -the "residents"

for the Park, and showed "Rowley" as the "resident" for space
#100.

(R. at 474. Appendice B, attached hereto.)
17.

On or about April 1, 1995, Richard Rowley entered into

a Rental Agreement with Brookside for space #100 in the Park.
(T. at 82.)

Peebles: "No, I did not." Q: "Were the Rowleys' paying rent for
the privilege of living in your home?" Sam Peebles: "Yes, they
were." (T. 189, Line 3-7.)(See also the discussion on page 411,
line 4 through page 412, line 10.)
7

18.

In September or October 1995, Richard Rowley abandoned

the Mobile Home, leaving back rent owing to the Park.

(R. at

413 . )
19.

In October, 1995, the Park manager contacted Sam

Peebles and demanded that he bring current the rent on space
#100.

(R. at 413-14.)
20.

On October 31, 1995, Sam Peebles paid $591.00 to

Brookside for rent on space #100, which included back rent owed
by Richard Rowley.

(T. at 413-14; 189; Exhibit D-72, attached

hereto as Appendice C.)
21.

After Richard Rowley moved out, Sam Peebles decided to

fix up the Mobile Home and sell it in the Park.
22.

(T. at 418-19.)

During November and December, 1995, Sam Peebles began

making repairs on the Mobile Home.
23.

(R. at 421-22.)

On or about December 10, 1995, Sam Peebles entered into

a Real Estate Purchase Contract to sell the Mobile Home to Jake
Grider.

(T. at 287.)

24.

Jake Grider had been approved for a loan by Washington

Mutual to purchase the Mobile Home.
25.
residency.
26.

(T. at 287.)

Brookside denied Jake Grider's application for
(T. at 288.)
Several weeks later, Jake Grider purchased another

mobile home and was approved for residency at Meadowbrook Mobile
8

Home Park.
27.

(T. at 289-90.)
On or about December 11, 1995, Brookside served Sam

Peebles with a "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit," demanding payment of
$215.00 for "rent now due and owing for the month of December,"
and providing that failure to pay "may result in immediate
termination of your lease."

(Exhibit D-83, attached hereto as

Appendice D.)
28.

On December 11, 1995, Sam Peebles paid $215.00 for

December rent and continued to pay the monthly rent on space
#100.

On January 3, 1995, Sam Peebles paid $215.00 for January

rent for space #100.

On February 5, 1996, Sam Peebles paid .

$215.00 for February rent for space #100.

On March 5, 1996, Sam

Peebles paid $215.00 March rent for space #100.

(T. at 415-16;

Exhibit P-58, attached hereto as Appendice E.)
29.

After Jake Grider's application was rejected, Sam

Peebles continued to make repairs to the Mobile Home in order to
sell it in the Park.
30.

(T. at 421.)

Sam Peebles invested $5,000 to $6,000 in improvements

to the Mobile Home.3
3

Sam Peebles retarred and reshingled the roof. (T. at 42232); hired someone to steam clean the exterior of the Mobile Home
(T. at 422); replaced the skirting around the exterior (T. at
424) ; put new trim on parts of the exterior (T. at 426) ;
installed new carpet in two bedrooms (T. at 427); replaced part
of the railing (T. at 433); put new linoleum in the bathroom and
the kitchen (T. at 441); replaced the subfloor in the bathroom
9

31.

On or about April 11, 1996, Brookside posted a 5-day

"Notice to Quit" on Mobile Home, advising Sam Peebles that he had
5-days to remove the Mobile Home from space #100 or he would be
in "unlawful detainer" under the Unlawful Detainer Act.

(Exhibit

P-42, attached hereto as Appendice F.)
32.

On April 12, 1996, Sam Peebles entered into another

Real Estate Purchase Contract to sell his Mobile Home to Marie
Gibson.

(T. at 376, Line 8-22.)

33.

Marie Gibson had also been approved by Washington

Mutual for a loan to purchase the Mobile Home.
34.
residency.
35.

(T. at 3 82.)

Brookside denied Marie Gibson's application for
(T. at 379.)
Shortly thereafter, Marie Gibson purchased a mobile

home in Shadowridge Mobile Home Park and was approved for
residency in that park.
36.

(T. at 382-83.)

On September 25, 1996, Sam Peebles entered into a Real

Estate Purchase Contract to sell his Mobile Home to Jackie
Southworth ("Ms. Southworth") for $25,000.

(T. at 296; Exhibit

D-67, attached hereto as Appendice G.)

(T. at 441); textured the ceilings in the bathroom, hallways and
two bedrooms (T. at 441); repaired or replaced several light
fixtures (T. at 441); replaced shower fixtures (T. at 442);
replaced five windows (T. at 358); paneled the closets (T. at
3 58); replaced three interior doors and one exterior door (T. at
361); repaired the front gate and fence (T. at 361); and hauled
two 16' trailer loads of trash to the dump (T. at 361).
10

37.

Ms. Southworth had an inspector and a subcontractor go

through the Mobile Home.
38.

(T. at 312.)

Based on the inspector and subcontractor's

recommendations, Ms. Southworth was prepared to invest $4,000 in
improving the Mobile Home, and she had a list of improvements to
review with the Park manager.
39.

(T. at 306-308.)

Ms. Southworth owned a Mental assisting training

program and dental practice."

Because she was self-employed, she

was also prepared to discuss her financial information with the
Park, including providing tax returns if necessary.

(T. at 306-

08.)
40.

Ms. Southworth made an appointment with Jim Prentice,

the Park manager, to fill out the residency application, discuss
the list of improvements she wanted to make and review her
financial information.
41.

(T. at 313.)

Upon arriving at the Park, Jim Prentice turned Ms.

Southworth away, refusing to meet with her or even allow her to
fill out an application for residency.
42.

(T. at 313.)

Sam Peebles called other mobile home parks, but could

not find any spaces available along the Wasatch Front.

(T. at

446.)
43.

Sam Peebles finally moved his Mobile Home to Evanston,

Wyoming, where he sold it at a net profit of $1,422.60.
11

(T. at

520.)
44.

From his $591 payment on October 31, 1995, until

November, 1997, when the Mobile Home was moved out of the Park,
Sam Peebles made all monthly lot rent payments on space #100 to
Brookside.

(T. at 416.)
STATEMENT OF CASE

1.

On April 10, 1996, Brookside filed a Complaint against

Sam Peebles alleging unlawful detainer by Sam Peebles of lot #100
of the Park. (R. 1-7.)
2.

On May 9, 1996, Brookside filed an Amended Complaint

adding Harold Peebles as a defendant.
3.
Judgment.
4.

(R. at 1-7; 17-24.)

On August 8, 1996, Brookside filed a Motion for Summary
(R. at 4 0 6.)
On December 4, 1996, Judge Barrett denied Brookside's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
5.

On March 28, 1997, the court granted Sam Peebles leave

to file a Counterclaim, which alleged that Brookside had
wrongfully withheld approval of three prospective purchasers.
(R. at 231.)
6.

On August 11, 1997, Brookside filed a second Motion for

Summary Judgment, on grounds similar to those in the first Motion
for Summary Judgment.
7.

(R. at 440-544.)

On October 27, 1997, Judge Fratto filed a Notice of
12

Decision granting plaintiff's second Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R. at 616-18.)
8.

On November 18, 1997, Sam and Harold Peebles filed a

Motion for Reconsideration.
9.

(R. at 694.)

On March 13, 1998, the court entered an Order granting

defendants' Motions for Reconsideration and denying plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
10.

(R. at 749-50.)

A jury trial was held on October 1, 2 and 5, 1998.

at 1-721.)
11.

Following plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a

directed verdict as to Sam Peebles on the following grounds:
A. The Unlawful Detainer Act provides that
"[u]nlawful detainer by an owner resident of
a mobile home is determined under Title 57,
Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(2) (1996).
Because
Sam Peebles is an "owner" and "resident,"
plaintiff must proceed under the Mobile Home
Park Residency Act, not under the Unlawful
Detainer Act. (T. at 237-240.)
B. Even if the Unlawful Detainer Act does
apply, Sam Peebles had been paying monthly
rent (i.e., $591 on October 31, 1995, $215 in
December, 1995, January, 1996, February, 1996
and March, 1996) and, as a matter of law, Sam
Peebles was a month-to-month tenant and must
be given at least 15-days notice under
section 78-36-3(1)(b)(i), and could not be
evicted as a "tenant at will."
(T. at 237240. )
C. Even if the Unlawful Detainer Act does
apply, and if Sam Peebles was a "tenant at
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(T.

will/' Brookside failed to serve Sam Peebles
with the 5-day notice in the manne * provided
in section 78-36-6(4).
(T. at 237-240.)
12.

Defendant also moved for a directed verdict as to

Harold Peebles on the same three grounds, as well as the
additional ground that there had been no service of the 5-day
notice on Harold Peebles since Harold Peebles was not named on
the 5-day "Notice to Quit."
13.
verdict.
14.

The trial court granted both motions for directed
(T. at 258-263.)
Defendant Sam Peebles then presented his counterclaim

to the jury.
15.

(T. at 237-240.)

(T. at 284-627.)

The jury answered the following questions:
1A.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that prior to January 4, 1995, when Brookside
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. acquired the Park, that
defendant Sam Peebles had a written lease or
rental agreement with the Park for the lease of
Space #100?
Yes

IB.

X

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that Sam Peebles' lease or rental agreement was
surrendered?
Yes

1C.

No

No

X

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. assumed Sam
Peebles lease or rental agreement?
Yes

No
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X

IIA. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. unreasonably
withheld approval of one or more prospective
purchasers of Sam Peebles' Mobile Home, to become
a resident in the Park?
Yes

No

X

(R. at 920-21, attached hereto as Appendice H.)
16.

On October 28, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion for

Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs as the prevailing
party on the Counterclaim.
17.

(R. at 1100.)

On November 5, 1998, defendants filed a Motion for

Attorney's Fees and Court Costs, the prevailing parties on the
eviction action.
18.

(R. at 1161.)

On March 1, 1999, the court denied both motions.

(R.

at 1285.)
19.

On May 26, 1999, a final Judgement was entered.

(R. at

1292. )
20.

On June 1, 1999, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal.

(R. at 1300.)
21.
Appeal.

On June 8, 1999, defendant filed a Notice of Cross(R. at 1305.)
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and thereby denying
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment because numerous factual
15

issues existed which precluded summary judgment.

Furthermore,

even assuming that Sam Peebles' supplemental affidavit
contradicted his deposition testimony, and Brookside was a common
law bona fide purchaser, as plaintiff contends, the Mobile Home
Park Residency Act and Unlawful Detainer Act renders both issues
moot; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and thereby
denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Second, the trial court did not err in granting defendants'
Motion for Directed Verdict.

The facts of this case support the

trial court's grant of defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict
because 1) the Unlawful Detainer Act does not apply; 2) even if
the Unlawful Detainer Act applied, Sam Peebles was not a "tenant
at will"; and 3) Sam Peebles was not properly served notice under
the Unlawful Detainer Act.

Furthermore, plaintiff's argument

that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict because
Brookside did not "assume" Sam Peebles' lease is rendered moot by
the Mobile Home Park Residency Act and Unlawful Detainer Act.
Under those Acts, with which plaintiff failed to comply, the
trial court properly granted defendants' Motion for Directed
Verdict.
Third, the jury erred in finding that plaintiff's refusal to
accept an application for residency from Ms. Southworth was not
16

an "unreasonable withholding" of approval of residency under
section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code.

The Utah Code provides that

a "mobile home park . . . may not . . . unreasonably withh[o]Id"
approval of a prospective purchaser.
(Supp. 1999).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-4(4)

The prospective purchaser in this case, Ms.

Southworth (the last of three prospective purchasers to be
rejected by plaintiff), was willing to spend $4,000 on
improvements on the Mobile Home, had an inspector and
subcontractor inspect the Mobile Home, and had her financial
information, including tax returns, available for review if
necessary.

Nevertheless, Brookside refused to meet with her, and

refused to allow her to fill out an application.

Plaintiff's

actions constituted an "unreasonable withh[o]Id[ing]" of a
prospective purchaser, and the jury verdict should therefore be
reversed.
Fourth, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's
Motion for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs.

In

order to recover attorney's fees and court costs, plaintiff must
direct this Court to some statute or contractual basis for that
owned.

Plaintiff has not done so.

Plaintiff's argument that

section 57-16-8 of the Utah Code supports its claim for
attorney's fees and court costs must be rejected since by its
terms, section 57-16-8 does not award attorney's fees to the
prevailing party on the counterclaim.
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Finally, the trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion
for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs.

The Utah Code

provides that "[i]f a resident elects to contest an eviction
proceeding . . . [t]he prevailing party is . . . entitled to
court costs and reasonable attorney's fees."
16-8 (1994).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-

Defendants contested an eviction proceeding, and -

they prevailed on the eviction proceeding; therefore, under Utah
law, defendants are entitled to ''court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees."

Id.

The trial court's denial of defendants'

Motion for Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs was
therefore incorrect, and this Court should reverse that decision
and remand this case for a determination consistent therewith,
including attorney's fees and costs incurred by defendants for
successfully defending plaintiff's appeal of the eviction action.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration.

Even assuming arguendo

plaintiff's contentions that Sam Peebles' Supplemental affidavit
contradicted his deposition testimony, and that Brookside was a
common law bona fide purchaser, the trial court's decision to
grant defendants' Motion for Reconsideration was not an "abuse of
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discretion" because the application of the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act and the Unlawful Detainer Act rendered both issues
moot.
Moreover, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, i.e., Peebles, disputed issues of
material facts existed which precluded summary judgment for the
moving party, i.e., Brookside.

See Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. &

Gen, Med, Clinic, Inc. , 2000 UT 18, 1J4, 994 P.2d 1261, 1263
(setting forth standard for reviewing motion for summary
judgment).

Even assuming arguendo plaintiff's contentions that

the common law "surrender" doctrine and/or the common law "bona
fide purchaser" doctrine were relevant in this case, numerous
disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and that
decision should be allowed to stand.

A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Summary Judgment on plaintiff's "surrender" claim
1. Even disregarding Sam Peebles' Supplemental Affidavits,
other issues of material fact existed regarding
plaintiff's "surrender" claims which supported the trial
court's denial of summary judgment
Even disregarding Sam Peebles' Supplemental Affidavits,
other issues of material fact existed which supported the trial
court's denial of summary judgment on Brookside's "surrender"
19

claim.

Under the common law doctrine of "surrender and

acceptance:"

a) a tenant must "surrender [] the premises to [the]

landlord before a lease term expires," b) the tenant must intend
to "rescind" or "terminate" the lease, and c) the landlord must
"accept the surrender."

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 776 P.2d

896, 900-01 (Utah 1989) (discussing elements of surrender and
acceptance).

In this case, even disregarding Sam Peebles'

Supplemental Affidavits, all three elements were in dispute.

(a) No surrender of the premises
First, Sam Peebles did not surrender lot #100 to Brookside
at the time Brookside entered into its lease with Richard Rowley.
Sam Peebles' Mobile Home was on lot #100.

Accordingly, the first

element was not satisfied.
(b) No intent by Sam Peebles to surrender his lease
Second, there was an issue of fact as to whether Sam Peebles
intended to surrender his lease.

Plaintiff argues that the

following testimony from Sam Peebles' deposition is conclusive
evidence that Sam Peebles intended to surrender his lease:
Q.

Okay. Each time there people leased the
trailer from you, do you know if they made an
application with the park to lease this?

A.

Yes, they did.

Q.

Okay. And they would have gone through an
application process?

A.

Yes.

They were suppose to.
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Q.

They would have to sign a lease agreement?

A.

Yup.

(Deposition of Sam Peebles at 21-22.)
Sam Peebles assumed that Richard Rowley signed a lease with the
Park because it was common practice to have both the sublessee
and sublessor enter into lease with the Park to guarantee payment
of lot rent.
In her deposition testimony, Jan Shupe, one of the Park
managers, testified that it was common to have two leases for the
same space (one between the Park and the sublessee and one
between the Park and the sublessor) to ensure payment of rent:
Q.

Would it be your common practice as the
manager to have two leases for the same
space, one lease with Mr. Rowley, and
one lease with Mr. Peebles for the same
space?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Why would you do that?

A.

Well, to guarantee the lot rent. If Rowley
didn't [pay], then Peebles would have to.

(R. 332, 592.)
Ms. Shupe's testimony illustrates that it was common practice for
the Park to use two leases.

Sam Peebles' knowledge that the Park

may have required Rowley to enter into a separate lease did not
constitute an intent by Sam Peebles to surrender his lease.
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This

was evidenced by Sam Peebles' payment of $591 in back rent owed
by Richard Rowley on October 31, 1995.

Had Sam Peebles intended

to surrender his lease, he would not have paid back rent to the
Park.
(c) No intent by Brookside to accept a surrender
Third, there is no evidence that Brookside intended to
accept a surrender of Sam Peebles' lease when Richard Rowley
entered into a lease with Brookside on or about April 1, 1995.
After Richard Rowley moved out, the park manager for Brookside
called Sam Peebles and asked him to pay on the back rent for lot
#100.

(T. at 413.)

On October 31, 1995, Sam Peebles paid the

$591 in back rent owed on lot #100.
attached hereto as Appendice C.)

(T. at 413-14; Exhibit D-72,

On December 11, 1995, Brookside

served Sam Peebles with a written notice stating that Brookside
would "terminate [Sam Peebles'] lease" if he did not continue
making the rent payments.
as Appendice D.)

(T. 4 95; Exhibit D-82, attached hereto

Had Brookside intended to accept a surrender of

Sam Peebles' lease, Brookside would not have continued to look to
Sam Peebles for payment of the rent.
Brookside argues that "[t]he doctrine of surrender requires
only that the Peebles assented the creation of an estate between
Rowley and Brookside."

Brief of Appellant at 14, Brookside

Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Ct. App.
22

filed Feb. 14, 2000) (footnote omitted).
the law.

In fact, that is not of

In the authority cited for that proposition, Brookside

failed to include the underlined portion:
There is a presumption that acceptance by
the tenant of a new lease of the premises
during the term of an old lease operates as a
surrender of the old lease by act of the
parties; that is, a surrender of a lease is
implied by law when another estate is created
by the reversioner or remainderman, with the
assent of the tenant, that is incompatible
with the existing term. Thus, as a general
rule, when a new lease of the premises is
taken by the lessee from the lessor for the
whole or a part of the term embraced in the
former one, there is said to be a surrender
in law because the giving of a new lease
necessarily implies a surrender of the old
one.
49 AM. JUR. 2 D Landlord

and Tenant

§ 252 (1995) (emphasis added &

footnotes omitted); compare Brief of Appellant at 14 n.2,
Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles. No. 990518 (Utah Ct.
App. filed Feb. 14, 2000) (misstating same).

When the first line

is restored, it is clear that the quote cited by plaintiff
involves a situation where the same tenant signs a second lease
for the premises prior to the expiration of the first lease.
That is not what occurred in this case; thus, plaintiff's
statement of the applicable law is misplaced, and it should be
disregarded by this Court.
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The other case, Automatic Gas Distributors, Inc. v. State
Bank of Green River, 817 P.2d 441 (Wyo. 1991), which is also
cited by plaintiff, should likewise be disregarded by this Court
because it stands for the sa e proposition as the previous
citation: "[A]cceptance by the tenant of a new lease of the
demised premises during the term of an old lease operates as a
surrender of the old lease by the act of the parties."
443.

Id. at

Because Sam Peebles was not a party to the "Rowley lease,"

the principle set forth in Automatic Gas is inapplicable and
should not be relied upon by this Court as a basis for reversing
the trial court's decision denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
2. Sam Peebles' Supplemental Affidavit did not conflict with

his deposition
Sam Peebles' Supplemental Affidavits did not conflict with
his deposition testimony.

In his Supplemental Affidavits, Sam

Peebles clarified that even though he knew that Rowley may have
entered into a lease with the Park, he did not intended to
surrender his lease.

The jury agreed with Sam Peebles and found

that Sam Peebles did not surrender his lease.

(£L££. Jury's

response to interrogatory number IB, R. at 920.)

To find that

the trial court abused its discretion in not granting plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment is to overturn the jury verdict on
this issue.
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3.

Even if Peebles had surrendered his lfiaser Brooksidp
failed to comply with the Unlawful Detainer Ant
and Mobile Home Park Residency Act

Even if Sam Peebles had surrendered his lease in April,
1994, as a result of Rowley's lease being signed, and the jury's
finding that Sam Peebles did not surrender his lease is reversed,
the trial court still did not abuse its discretion in granting
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration since plaintiff still
failed to make a prima
Unlawful Detainer Act.

facie

case against Sam Peebles under the

Those grounds are discussed more fully

under Section II.4
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
summary judgment on Brookside's "bona fide purchaser"

claim
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting
Summary Judgment on Brookside's Bona Fide Purchaser claim because
disputed issues of material fact existed as to:

4

1) Whether

Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie
case against Sam
Peebles under the Unlawful Detainer Act in three particulars: 1)
Section 78-36-3(2) provides that "[u]nlawful detainer by an owner
resident is determined under ... [the] Mobile Home Park Residency
Act," not under the Unlawful Detainer Act, 2) by paying monthly
lot rent for seven months Sam Peebles was not a "tenant at will,"
but was at least a "month-to-month" tenant entitled to 15-days
notice under section 78-36-3(1)(b)(i), and 3) Brookside had
failed to properly serve Sam Peebles with the 5-day notice under
section 78-36-6.
The jury verdict provided an additional ground to dismiss
the eviction action. In finding that Sam Peebles had a "written
lease" for space #100 that had never been surrendered, Sam
Peebles was entitled to the protection of section 57-16-4(1).
25

Brookside was a "common law" bona fide purchaser; 2) whether the
"common law" bona fide Purchaser rule has been pre-empted by the
Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and 3) whether, even if Brookside
was a "bona fide purchaser" and the Mobile Home Park Residency
Act did not apply, Brookside failed to comply with the Unlawful
Detainer Act.

1.

Brookside was not a "bona fide purchaser"

At the very least, Brookside purchased the Park with
constructive notice of Sam Peebles' lease since Sam Peebles'
Mobile Home was located on space #100.

Under those

circumstances, the "[grantee's] position is no stronger than that
of [its] grantors."
622 (Utah 1940) .

Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 104 P.2d 619,

In Latses, the grantor claimed that he had no

"knowledge of such a lease" and contended that "the agent had no
authority to enter into it."

Xd. at 621.

The court held that

the lease was nevertheless valid, and the grantee took the
property "subject to" the lease.
applies here.

Id. at 622.

The same analysis

The jury found that Sam Peebles had a "written

lease" with Brookside's predecessor that had never been
surrendered.

Brookside had "constructive notice" of the Peebles

lease since the Peebles' Mobile Home was located on space #100 at
the time of the purchase.

Therefore, Brookside's "position is no

stronger than that of [it's predecessor]."
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Id.

2.

Brookside assumed the Peebles lease under the Assignment

At the time Brookside purchased the Park, under the
Assignment, Brookside assumed all "leases and agreements
appurtenant to the Property."5

Because Sam Peebles had a written

lease with Brookside's predecessor in interest, which was
appurtenant to the Park, that lease was assigned to Brookside.
The November, 1994, rent roll attached to the Assignment
listed "Rowley" as the "resident" of Space #100 of Brookside
Mobile Home Park.

(Richard and LaDawn Rowley were subleasing

that space from Sam Peebles, who owned the Mobile Home on Space
#100 and who had the underlying lease for Space #100).

There

was, however, no list of the specific leases that were
appurtenant to the property. Accordingly, because Sam Peebles'
lease was appurtenant to the property, it was assigned to
Brookside under the Assignment.
3. The common law "bona fide purchaser" rule is pre-empted
by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act
Even if Brookside was a common law "bona fide purchaser" and

5

In the second recital of the Assignment of Leases and
Deposits, the term "leases" is defined as "all of [the
assignor's] right, title and interest in and to those certain
leases, rental agreements, security or other deposits from
tenants, and rentals with respect to such leases and agreements
appurtenant to the property." In paragraph 1 of the Assignment
of Leases and Deposits, Brookside Associates (the "Assignor")
"bargains, sales, assigns, transfers sets over to Assignee, all
of its right, title and interest in and to the leases."
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has not assumed Sam Peebles' lease, the common law "bona fide
purchaser" rule is pre-empted by the Mobile Home Park Residency
Act.

Section 57-16-4(1) of the Utah Code provides that "[a]

mobile home park or its agents may not terminate a lease or
rental agreement upon any grounds other than as specified in this
chapter."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-4(1) (Supp. 1999).

There is no

"bona fide purchaser" exception to section 57-16-4(1).
Accordingly, if a person has a "lease or rental agreement" for a
space within a mobile home park, that "lease or rental agreement"
may not be terminated except as provided in the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act.

It makes no difference whether the lease or

rental agreement is with the present owner of the Park or a
previous owner of the Park.

The rationale for not providing a

bona fide purchase exception under the Act is simple.

A mobile

home park resident has no control over whether his lease is
properly transferred to a new purchaser of the park.

If all

existing leases are not properly disclosed to a purchaser of a
park, the purchaser's remedy is against the seller, not the
tenant.

The tenant should not be penalized by losing his rights

under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act under circumstances
(i.e., a sale of the park) over which he has no control.
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4. Even if Brookside was a bona fide purchaser and the
Mobile Home Park Residency Act does not pre-empt the
common law "bona fide purchaser" rule, Brookside failed
to comply with the Unlawful Detainer Act
Even if Brookside was a "bona fide purchaser" of the Park,
and even if Brookside took the Park free of Sam Peebles' lease
notwithstanding the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, the trial
court still did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants'
Motion to Reconsider because Brookside failed to comply with the
Unlawful Detainer Act.6

Those grounds are discussed more fully

in under Section II.
5.

Brookside's claim for unlawful detainer is moot

Even assuming Brookside's action for unlawful detainer is
proper in all respects, the issue of unlawful detainer is moot
since Peebles vacated space #100 in November, 1997.

(T. at 158.)

The issue of damages is also moot since Sam Peebles has paid all
rent due and owing through the date he vacated lot #100.
(a) Section 57-16-8 "Safe Harbor"
Because Peebles has vacated space #100 Brookside's only
remaining claim is for "treble damages" from April, 1995 through
November, 1997, the period the Peebles are alleged to have been

6

In its memorandum decision granting defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration, one basis stated by the court for granting that
Motion for Reconsideration was that "facts could be interpreted
to demonstrate that [Sam Peebles] was dealt with by Plaintiff in
a manner reflective of his perceived position as [a] tenant.
Most notably, that the notice to vacate refers to defendant as a
tenant."
(R. at 744.) This was the grounds upon which the court
dismissed the Amended Complaint in its directed verdict.
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in "unlawful detainer."

Section 57-16-8 of the Utah Code

provides that "[i]f a resident elects to contest an eviction
proceeding, all rents, fees and services charges due and incurred
during the pendency of the action shall be paid into the court
.

.

."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-8

(1994).

In t h i s

case,

as

an

accommodation to Brookside, the rents were paid directly to
Brookside during the pendency of this litigation.

Section 57-16-

8 does not provide for a trebling of rents, however.
Accordingly, with all rents paid and the premises vacated, the
issue of unlawful detainer is moot.
(b) The Unlawful Detainer Act does not allow for treble •
damages in this case
Irrespective of Section 57-16-8, treble damages are not
allowed for by the Unlawful Detainer Act in this case.

The

relevant language from the Unlawful Detainer Act is as follows:
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from
any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premisses during the
defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in
the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged
unlawful detainer is after default in the
payment of rent; and
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(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction
as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 7838-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant
for the rent, for three times the amount of the damages
assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and
for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided
for in the lease or agreement.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-10 (1996) .

Under that language, there are only treble rents for damages
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c).
(2)(d) "amount of rent due."

There is no trebling of

The "rental value" of space #100 is

not a damage since the rent was paid during the pendency of the
litigation.

The provision for treble damages is "highly penal

and therefore is subject to strict construction."
Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930).

Forrester v.

Accordingly, because the

Peebles have vacated the premises and paid all rents, there are
no damages for the rents due, and there is no basis for treble
damages for unpaid rent.

Therefore, the unlawful detainer claim

is moot.
C. The trial court had additional grounds to grant
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
There were also other reasonable grounds for granting
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration.
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(a) Waiver and estoppel
Even if Brookside was a bona fide purchaser and Sam Peebles
had surrendered his lease, there was a factual issue as to
whether Brookside had waived these defenses or was estopped from
raising them by accepting rent from Sam Peebles from October 1995
through March 1996. 7

See, e.g., Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245,

248 (Utah 1983)(stating that u[w]here by reason of a breach of a
condition, a lease becomes forfeited, the lessor is entitled to
recover possession.
rent.

He waives that right by the acceptance of

He cannot accept rent, and at the same time claim a

forfeiture of the lease.")

(Emphasis added & footnote omitted).

(b) Law of the case
Even if Brookside was a bona fide purchaser and Sam Peebles
had surrendered his lease, under the "law of the case," having
denied Brookside's first Motion for Summary Judgment, the court
should not have considered a second Motion for Summary Judgment
on substantially the same ground.

See Salt Lake City Corp. v.

James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 4 2 , 45 n.5 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)(stating that the "law of the case" provides a presumption
that the court's prior rulings are "correct and should stand.").

7

These defenses were raised as an affirmative defenses in
Defendants' Amended Answer.
(R. at 137-38.)
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D. Harold Peebles
In addition to the foregoing, there is nothing in
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment alleging any basis for
judgment against Harold Peebles.

Harold Peebles never occupied

the space, never leased the space, and never had any dealings
with Brookside.
In sum, there are numerous "reasonable grounds" to uphold
the trial court's decision to grant defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration, and thereby deny plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Accordingly, this Court should allow the trial court's

decision to stand.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
The trial court correctly granted defendant's Motion for
Directed Verdict.

Brookside's sole argument for overturning the

trial court's directed verdict is that the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act does not apply because there was "no lease between
Brookside and the Peebles."

Brief of Appellant at 19, Brookside

Mobile Homfi Parkr Ltd. v. Peebles, No. 990518 (Utah Ct. App.
filed Feb. 14, 2000).

Plaintiff argues that

"[t]he trial

court's action is especially nonsensical in that the jury later
found under special verdict instructions that no lease existed
between Brookside and Peebles."

Id.
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Plaintiff misapprehends the basis for the trial court's
directed verdict.

All three grounds for dismissal were based on

Brookside's failure to establish a prima
Unlawful Detainer Act.

facia

case under the

The trial court correctly granted a

directed verdict as to Sam Peebles because:

1) The Unlawful

Detainer Act does not apply; 2) even if the Unlawful Detainer Act
did apply, Sam Peebles was not a "tenant at will" and; 3) Sam
Peebles was not properly served.
A.

The Unlawful Detainer Act does not apply

The Unlawful Detainer Act provides that "[u]nlawful detainer
by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined under Title
57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act."
78-36-3(2) (1996).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§

Sam Peebles was an "owner" of the Mobile Home

as evidenced by the title to the Mobile Home that was introduced
at trial.
A "resident" of a mobile home is defined as "an individual
who leases or rents space in a Mobile Home park."
57-16-3(3) (1994).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§

By the conclusion of plaintiff's case,

evidence had been introduced that Sam Peebles had paid Brookside
$591 in rent for space #100 on October 31, 1995, $215 in rent on
December 11, 1995, $215 in rent on January 3, 1996, $215 in rent
on February 5, 1996 and $215 in rent on March 5, 1996.

On April

10, 1996, Sam Peebles was served with a 5-day Notice to Quit as a
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"tenant at will."

Accordingly, Sam Peebles was a "resident" at

the time the 5-day notice was served since he was "an individual
who leases or rents space in a Mobile Home park."
Therefore, having met the definition of "owner resident,"
Brookside could not proceed against Sam Peebles under the
Unlawful Detainer Act.

The Unlawful Detainer Act provides that

"[u]nlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is
determined under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency
Act."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-3(2) (1996).

Because plaintiff

brought its eviction action under the wrong statute, i.e., under
the Unlawful Detainer Act rather than the Mobile Home Park
Residency Act, the trial court properly dismissed Brookside's
Amended Complaint, and determined that Brookside could not evict
Sam Peebles under the Unlawful Detainer Act but must proceed
under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
B. Sam Peebles was not a "Tenant at Will"
Brookside served Sam Peebles with a 5-day Notice to Quit as
a "tenant at will."

At the very least, because Sam Peebles was

making monthly rental payments, he was entitled to 15-day notice
under section 78-36-3(1) (b) (i) of the Utah Code.

The Unlawful

Detainer Act requires 15-day of notice before termination of a
month-to-month tenancy:
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(1) A tenant of real property, for term less than life, is
guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(b)

when, having leased real property for an
indefinite time with monthly or other
periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in
person or by subtenant after the end
of any month or period, in cases
where the owner, his designated
agent, or any successor in estate of
the owner, 15 days or more prior to
the end of that month or period, has
served notice requiring him to quite
the premises at the expiration of
that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will,
where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration
of a notice of not less than five
day . . . .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-3 (1) (b) (i) - (ii) (1996).

As a matter of law, Sam Peebles was not a "tenant at will."
See Harry's Village, Inc. v. Egg Harbor Township, 446 A.2d 862,
865 (N.J. 1982) (holding that mobile home park tenants, without
written leases, paying month to month rent, are not tenants at
will) ; Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods., Ino+,

515

P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1973) (holding that tenant under invalid or
unenforceable lease is not a tenant at will).
Sam Peebles had been making monthly rental payment to
Brookside since October, 1995.

Therefore, even if the Unlawful

Detainer Act did apply, Sam Peebles was a month-to-month tenant
entitled to 15-days notice under section 78-36-3(1) (b) (i) .
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C. The 15-day Notice was improperly served.
In order to make a prima

facie

case for eviction under the

Unlawful Detainer Act, Brookside must prove that Sam Peebles
"remain[ed] in possession . . . after the expiration of a notice
of not less than five days."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-3(1) (b) (i)

(1996) . Section 78-36-6 sets forth the requirements for service
of that notice:
if a person of suitable age or discretion
cannot be found at the place of residence,
then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous
place on the leased property.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-6 (2) (d) (Supp. 1999).

In this case, Brookside knew that Sam Peebles did not live
in the Mobile Home.

Plaintiff also knew Sam Peebles' "place of

residence" because that address (12067 South 2240 West, Riverton,
Utah 84065) was written on the 5-day notice.

At trial, plaintiff

introduced no evidence that a "person of suitable age or
discretion could not be located at [Sam Peebles'] place of
residence."

The 5-day notice was only posted on the Mobile Home.

Brookside should not be able to "start the clock running" on
alleged "treble damages" by affixing a notice on a vacant Mobile
Home when Brookside knew where the owner resided and made no
effort to serve him at his place of residence, as required by
section 78-36-6.
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D. The directed verdict should also be upheld because of the

jury's later findings
The jury provided an additional ground on which to uphold
the trial court's directed verdict.

In answering Interrogatories

No. 1A, the jury found that prior to January 4, 1995, when
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. acquired the Park, defendant Sam
Peebles had a written lease or rental agreement with the Park for
the lease of Space #100.

(R. at 920.)

The jury also found that

Sam Peebles' lease or rental agreement was not surrendered.
at 920.)

(R.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 57-16-4(1), Brookside

could "not terminate [Sam Peebles' lease] . . . upon any ground
other than as specified in [the Mobile Home Park Residency Act]."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-4(1) (Supp. 1999).

It is undisputed that

Brookside did not terminate Sam Peebles' lease on any ground set
forth in that Act.
E. The Trial Court Correctly Granted a Directed Verdict as
to Harold Peebles
The trial court correctly granted a directed verdict as to
Harold Peebles for the same reasons set forth for Sam Peebles.
In addition, there was no service of a 5-day notice on Harold
Peebles, and there was no case presented against Harold Peebles
at trial.
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1.

No Service of 5-day notice

There was no service of the 5-day notice on Harold Peebles.
The only name on the 5-day Notice to Quite is Sam Peebles.

(S££.

Exhibit P-42, attached hereto as Appendice F.)
2.

No case against Harold Peebles

Brookside presented no case against Harold Peebles at trial:
Judge Fratto: Presented at the trial there
has been no evidence that would indicate that
Harold Peebles is involved at all. None of
the witnesses, as I recall, identified him
... [I]n other words, I haven't heard
anything about Harold Peebles. I think the
record would then [disclose] his name has not
been uttered by any witness.
(T. at 260, lines 13-21.)
Plaintiff has cited nothing in its brief to dispute the foregoing
assertion.

Therefore, because Brookside made no case against

Harold Peebles at trial, the trial court did not err in granting
a directed verdict in his favor.
III.

THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT BROOKSIDE'S REFUSAL
TO ALLOW MS. SOUTHWORTH TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION
FOR RESIDENCY WAS NOT UNREASONABLE

The jury erred in finding that Brookside's refusal to accept
an application for residency from Ms. Southworth was not an
"unreasonable withholding" of approval of residency under the
Mobile Home Park Residency Act.

The Mobile Home Park Residency

Act provides that a mobile home park may not unreasonably refuse
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approval of a "prospective purchaser" of a mobile home within the
park:
Any rule or condition of a lease purporting
to prevent or unreasonably limit the sale of
a mobile home belonging to a resident is void
and unenforceable. The mobile home park may,
however, reserve the right to approve the
prospective purchaser of a mobile home who
intend to become a resident, but the approval
may not be unreasonably withheld. The mobile
home park may require proof of ownership as a
condition of approval. The mobile home park
may unconditionally refuse to approve any
purchaser of a mobile home who does not
register prior to purchase.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-4(4)

(Supp.

1999)

(emphasis

added).

In this case, Ms. Southworth was the third prospective purchaser
for Sam Peebles' Mobile Home that Brookside refused to approve
for residency within the Park.
By the time Ms. Southworth attempted to apply for residency,
the Park refused to even meet with her or accept her application.
On September 25, 1996, Ms. Southworth entered into a Real Estate
Purchase Contract to purchase the Mobile Home for $25,000.

Ms.

Southworth's real estate agent advised her that she would need to
"coordinate a time to meet with [the park manager] for qualifying
for the park."

(T. at 296, lines 23-24.)

Ms. Southworth called

the Park Manager, Jim Prentice, and he advised her that she would
need to "get a credit report."

(T. at 2 97, Line 1.)

Ms.

Southworth did as she was directed and she obtained a credit
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report through Western Credit, which she paid for herself.

(T.

at 297, Line 10-12. )
Ms. Southworth also had an inspector inspect the Mobile
Home.

Ms. Southworth testified that "I'm very meticulous about

what I live in, how it looks and so forth."
8.)

(T. at 311, Line 7-

She also testified that " [b]ecause I have children, and I'm

concerned about their welfare, making sure everything is done
right to coue, to make sure that the wiring and the plumbing and
the environment is safe."

(T. at 312, line 8-19.)

The inspector

"went through specific things that had to be brought up to code."
(T. at 305, line 1-6, 308, line 16-25.)

Ms. Southworth also had

a subcontractor inspect at the Mobile Home.

Ms. Southworth

testified that "I know that [the Mobile Home] needs some repairs,
and I was willing to put the money into it."
2.)

(T. at 312, line 1-

Based on those reports, Ms. Southworth stated that she was

going to put an additional $4,000.00 in improvements into the
Mobile Home:
I had a subcontractor come out with me and
look at it, and in fact he listed the price
of what everything would cost me. [T]he cost
of repairs was about $4,000.00 that I was
going to put into that trailer.
(T. at 10-15.)

Ms. Southworth compiled a list of improvements

that she was going to make, and she wanted to discuss those with
Jim Prentice, the Park manager.

(T. at 312, line 20-22.)
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Ms. Southworth made an appointment to meet with Jim Prentice
to fill out the application for residency, review her financial
information and go over the list of improvements she wanted to
make to the property.

However, Ms. Southworth testified that Jim

Prentice refused to meet with her:
I had gone to the office at 1:00, he was not
in the office. I then called my irealtor and
told her, have you heard from him, I haven't.
I then went back to the park and sat at the
office until somebody showed up. I got out
of the car. I then said, are you Jim? And
he had a trach[eotomy], apparently he said
yes, I am. I said, I'm Jackie Southworth I
was to meet with you 1:00. It was then 20
minutes after 1. He turned around kind of.
I took it very personal that he was angry at
me and said you can't buy that trailer, it
has to be moved it's in legality, it's in a
legality situation. I didn't even get my
door shut on my car before I was sent away by
him.
(T. at 301, line 12-25.)

Ms. Southworth further testified that

Jim Prentice refused to allow her to fill out an application or
discuss the improvements she was going to make to the trailer:
Q.

Okay. So you wanted to discuss with him
the repairs that you were going to make?

A.

Improvements for the park.

Q.

Was he willing to discuss that with you?

A.

He would not give me the time of day.
to discuss with me anything.

Q.

You said that you'd had with you the
credit information we looked at?
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He refused

A.

Exactly.

Q.

And were you going to review that with
him?

A.

Yes, I was, as well as fill out the application
for the park.

Q.

Okay. And you didn't have an
opportunity to do that?

A.

I never got my foot in the door.

(T. at 313, line 4-18. )
After Ms. Southworth testified, Jim Prentice took the stand.
He did not dispute that he refused to allow Ms. Southworth to
submit an application for residency in the Park.

Jim Prentice

did not dispute that he had refused to meet with Ms. Southworth.
Jim Prentice testified that he told her "she had been denied by
the owner."

(T. at 616.)

Alan Glover, the owner of the Park, had previously testified
that he had rejected Ms. Southworth's application for two reason:
1) he was "unable to verify employment," and 2) the "repairs on
the home" were not completed "at that time."

(T. at 70.)

A. Unable to Verify Employment
Ms. Southworth was self-employed and she "owned a dental
assisting training program and a dental practice."
line 16-17.)

(T. at 299,

Apparently, Western Credit could not "verify her

employment."
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Ms. Southworth testified that "I would not allow any of my
banks or personnel to verify anything to anyone without okay from
me."

(T. at 307, line 23-24.)

However, Ms. Southworth testified

that she could "verify [her income] by tax returns at anytime."
(T. at 308, line 4-5.)

At the time she came to discuss the

matter with Jim Prentice she was prepared to review her financial
information with him.

Jim Prentice would not meet with her or

allow her to fill out an application for residency.
B. Repairs not Made
As to Mr. Glover's testimony that Ms. Southworth was
rejected because all repairs had not been made to the Mobile
Home, Ms. Southworth testified that "I didn't even have time to
explain to him I had brought in a list of repairs and
improvements that I wanted to do the place .... I didn't even
get the door shut on my car, I didn't even get in the office."
(T. at 302, line 4-9.)
Ms. Southworth planned to invest an additional $4000 in
upgrading the Mobile Home.

For example, Ms. Southworth testified

that she wanted "to put a gate in where I could pour a cement pad
and have covered parking for my vet."

(T. at 313, 1-3.)

"[T]he

repairs that were being done were obvious ... [a][n]ew floor and
so on and so forth."
roof put on it."

(T. at 305, 12-16.)

(T. at 309, line 24.)
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"It had a brand new
"I was going to paint it

and do a lot of improvements on the lot."
310, line 1.)
it taken away.
with."

(T. at 3 09, line 25;

"The shed that was there I did not want, I wanted
I had a metal shed that I wanted to replace it

(T. at 308, line 14-18.)

"I knew that it needed some

repairs, and I was willing to put the money into that, you know,
to have that for my own."

(T. at 312, line 25; 312, line 26-27.)

Jim Prentice would not even meet with Ms. Southworth.

He

would not even allow her to fill out an application for
residency.

He would not allow her to discuss the improvements

she was going to make to the Mobile Home.

As this Court stated

in Qrtiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997), there was "no substantial competent evidence"
presented at trial "upon which a reasonable, fair jury could
enter a finding" that Brookside's denial of Ms. Southworth's
application for residency was not unreasonable.

Id. at 1218

(internal quotations, citation & footnote omitted).
Brookside's manager refused to accept an application for
residency from Ms. Southworth or even meet with her.

Ms.

Southworth tried to meet with Mr. Prentice to explain her
financial status, but he refused to discuss the matter with her,
telling her that her application, which she had not yet filled
out, had been denied.

She also had a list of improvements she

wanted to discuss with Jim Prentice, the Park manager.
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However,

Prentice would not "give her the time of day." Under the Ortiz
standard, "reasonable people would not differ" as to the
unreasonableness of such behavior.

Id. at 1216 (citations

omitted) .
Because the "great weight of the evidence" indicates that
Brookside "unreasonably withheld" approval of Ms. Southworth's
residency in violation of section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code,
the jury verdict should therefore be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR
SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING AGAINST THE COUNTERCLAIM

No legal basis exists for reversing the trial court's denial
of plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees for
successfully defending against Sam Peebles' counterclaim.

A

statutory or contractual basis must be asserted to recover costs
and attorney's fees.

See J.V, Hatch Constr, Inc. v. Kampros, 971

P.2d 8, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating that it "is wellestablished . . . [that] attorney's fees are generally not
awarded in Utah unless provided for by either statute or
contract.").

No such basis exists here, however.

Sam Peebles' counterclaim arose out of Brookside's refusal
to approve residency within the Park for Jake Grider, Marie
Gibson and Jackie Southworth.

In connection therewith, Sam

Peebles alleged six causes of action: 1) breach of contract, 2)
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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 3)
violation of section 57-16-4(4), 4) intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, 5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and 6) promissory estoppel.
A.

Breach of Contract

As to the claims for "breach of contract" and "breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing," there is no
contractual attorney's fees clause.

Therefore, Brookside is not

entitled to attorney's fees for defending against these two
claims.
B.

Section 57-16-4 (4)

Section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code provides that approval
of a prospective purchaser may not be "unreasonably withheld" by
a mobile home park.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-4(4) (Supp. 1999) .

There is nothing in that section (or elsewhere)' that allows for
an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party on a claim
that a mobile home park "unreasonably withheld" approval of a
prospective purchaser in violation of that section.
C

Interference with economic relations

Sam Peebles also claimed that Brookside tortiously
interfered with the prospective sale of his Mobile Home.
a "tort" claim.

This is

There is no basis for the prevailing party to

recover attorney's fees on this claim.
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D.

Infliction of emotional distress

There is no basis for the prevailing party to recover
attorney's fees under a claim for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

Furthermore, in plaintiff's Motion for

Allowance of Attorney's Fees and Court Costs, Brookside admits
that it is not entitled to attorney's fees for successfully
defending against this claim.

(R. at 1148.)

There is no

conceptual difference between that counterclaim and the others.
Having admitted below that it is not entitled to attorney's fee
for defending part of the counterclaim, Brookside has admitted
that it is not entitled to attorney's fees for defending any of
the counterclaim since all of the counterclaims are
indistinguishable for purpose of recovering attorney's fees.
E.

Promissory Estoppel

Finally, there is no basis for the prevailing party to
recover attorney's fees on a claim for promissory estoppel.
Plaintiff argues that it is statutorily entitled to
attorney's fees under Section 57-16-8.

This is not so.

Section

57-16-8 of the Utah Code provides that " [i]f a resident elects to
contest an eviction proceeding, . . . [t]he prevailing party is
entitled to attorney's fees."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-8 (1994).

By arguing that section 57-16-8 applies, Brookside concedes that
Peebles is a "resident," and accordingly the court's directed
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verdict in favor of defendants should be upheld and defendants
should be awarded their court cost and attorney's fees.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, section 57-16-8 does not
apply, by its terms, to any of the claims made under the
counterclaim.

Plaintiff relies on the following language from

that section: "Upon final termination of the issues between the
parties, the court shall order all amounts paid into court paid
to the mobile home park."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-18 (1994) .

However, the statute does not state that the "prevailing party"
on those "issues" is entitled to attorney's fees.

Rather, it

only states that upon termination of the issues "all amounts paid
into the court" shall be "paid to the mobile home park."
Furthermore, as used in the sentence, the term "issues" relates
to. issues in the "eviction proceeding," but not to those issues
raised in plaintiff's counterclaim.
Moreover, the counterclaim was not a defense to the eviction
proceeding.

The counterclaim was a completely different pleading

than the answer.

The counterclaim was filed approximately one

year after the eviction proceeding commenced.

If Sam Peebles had

prevailed on the counterclaim, he would not have been entitled to
recover his attorney's fees.

There is simply no basis for

plaintiff to recover its fees for successfully defending against
the counterclaim.
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Plaintiff is also not entitled to costs under Rule 54(d) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under that rule, where a

defendant prevails on the complaint, defendant is the prevailing
party for purposes of awarding costs, even though plaintiff
prevails on the counterclaim:
Suppose, for instance, a defendant presents
counterclaims against the plaintiff. If the
plaintiff loses on its claims, the defendant
is the prevailing party, even if the success
of the counterclaims is limited. If the
defendant's counterclaims are completely
unsuccessful, the plaintiff is the prevailing
party as to those claims, but the court may
still tax costs for those claims against the
plaintiff in its discretion.
10 JAMES WM. MOORE ET A L . ,

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 5 4 . 1 0 1 [3]

(3d

ed.

1999) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Terry Properties, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1540 (11th Cir. 1986) (although
defendant's counterclaims were defeated, district court did not
err in taxing costs for those claims against plaintiff, since
those claims never would have been asserted but for plaintiff's
suit).

Therefore, because plaintiff did not prevail on its First

Amended Complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to any costs.
In short, there is no legal basis for plaintiff to recover
attorney's fees for successfully defending against any of the six
claims under the counterclaim.

Furthermore, since plaintiff did

not prevail on the First Amended Complaint at trial, plaintiff is
not entitled to costs under Rule 54(d).
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion for
Costs and Attorney's Fees.

Section 57-16-8 of the Utah Code

provides that "[i]f a resident elects to contest an eviction
proceeding, . . . [t]he prevailing party is . . . entitled to
court costs and attorney's fees."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 57-16-8 (1994).

As previously discussed (see Section II above), Sam Peebles
was a "resident" as defined under section 57-16-1.
this was clearly "an eviction proceeding."

Furthermore,

It makes no

difference that Brookside brought the eviction proceeding under
the Unlawful Detainer Act.

The prayer for relief under the

Amended Complaint requests "an order of the court evicting
defendants from the Park and for a Writ of Restitution removing
the Mobile Home from said premises and restoring possession of
the same to the plaintiff."

(R. at 7.) (Emphasis added).

Thus,

the action was an "eviction action" as defined by section 57-168, and Sam Peebles is therefore entitled to his costs and
attorney's fees under section 57-16-8.
Defendants are also entitled to attorney's fees and costs on
appeal for successfully defending the eviction action.

Where the

party below is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, that party
is also entitled to attorney's fee on appeal.
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See, e.g., Living

Scriptures Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)("A
party who was awarded attorney fees and costs at trial is also
entitled to attorney fees and costs if that party prevails on
appeal.") (Internal quotation & citation omitted).

Thus,

defendants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that the
trial court did not "abuse its discretion" in granting
defendants' motion for reconsideration.

This Court should also

find that the trial court did not err in granting defendants'
motion for directed verdict, nor did it err in denying
plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees.
Additionally, this Court should overturn the jury verdict
and find that Brookside's refusal to meet with or even accept an
application for residency from Ms. Southworth is a per

se

violation of section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code, which provides
that approval of a prospective purchaser for residency may not be
"unreasonably withheld."
Finally, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial
of defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees for successfully
defending the eviction action, and remand this case for a
determination consistent therewith, including a determination of
defendants' attorney's fees on appeal for successfully defending
the eviction action.
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Appendice "A"
"Utah Certificate of title" showing Harold Boyd
Peebles and Samuel Peebles as owners of the Mobile
Home.
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B"

"Assignment of L e a s e s and D e p o s i t s " d a t e d
December 9, 1994

ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES AND DEPOSITS
THIS ASSIGNMENT is made and entered into on the y * day of
December, 1994, by and between BROOKSIDE ASSOCIATES, a Utah limited
partnership, hereinafter referred to as "Assignor", and MARIE M.
GLOVER and ALAN & BONNIE GLOVER TRUST, a general partnership
comprised of the MARIE M. GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST dated Nov. 30,
1983 and the ALAN H. GLOVER & BONNIE A GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST dated
Nov. 30, 1983, hereinafter referred to as "Assignee".
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, Assignor is the owner of that certain real property
and improvements located thereon known as Brookside Mobile Home
Park located at 8155 South 1700 West, West Jordan, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, more particularly described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, (hereinafter^
referred to as the "Property"); and
WHEREAS, Assignor has agreed to sell the Property to Assignee,all in accordance with the terms and conditions of a Commercial
Purchase Agreement, with counter-offer dated August 22, 1994, as
amended, made and entered into by and between Assignor, as Seller,
and Assignee, as Buyer, and to assign to Assignee all of its right,
title and interest in and to those certain leases, rental agreements, security or other deposits from tenants, and rentals with
respect to such leases and agreements appurtenant to the Property,
except as provided herein (hereinafter collectively referred to as
the "Leases"), which Leases, rents, and security deposits are more
particularly described on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference; and
WHEREAS, the Assignee desires to acquire from the Assignor all
of the right, title and interest of the Assignor in and to the
Leases, all in accordance with the terms and conditions hereinafter
set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby mutually agreed as follows:
1. Assignor, in consideration of the payment of Ten Dollars
and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, hereby bargains,
sells, assigns, transfers and sets over unto Assignee, all of its
right, title and interest in and to the Leases, hereby constituting
glovlcasasg (dkp)

Assignee as the true and lawful attorney in fact for the Assignor
irrevocably to adopt and pursue all lawful ways and means to
collect, renew, enforce, recover and reduce to possession and
ownership the Leases and rights hereby transferred.
2. Assignor hereby warrants to Assignee and its successors
and assigns that Assignor is hereby selling, assigning and
transferring to Assignee on the date hereof good and marketable
title to the Leases, free and clear of all liens, security
interests, encumbrances and rights of others. Assignor covenants
that it will warrant and defend such title against all claim and
demands whatsoever.
3.
Immediately after the execution and delivery of this
Assignment, Assignor, agrees to deliver to Assignee (or its
designee) all Leases, including but not limited to cash or certified funds in the amount of the security and other deposits.
Nothing herein shall preclude Assignor and Assignee from crediting
such funds as part of the closing relative to the sale and purchase
of the Property; provided, however, in the event of such procedure,
said security and other deposits shall be shown as separate debits
and credits upon settlement statements to be signed by the parties.
4. In consideration of the Assignor executing and delivering
this Agreement, Assignee covenants with the Assignor as follows:
a.

That the Assignee will duly keep, observe and perform all
of the terms, conditions and provisions of the Leases
after this date that are to be kept, observed and
performed by Assignor.

b.

That the Assignee will save and hold harmless the Assignor of and from any and all actions, suits, costs,
damages, claims and demands whatsoever arising by reason
of an act or omission of the Assignee.

5. Assignor shall indemnify Assignee against all claims, with
respect to:
a.

the discharge and performance of any duties and obligations to be performed or discharged by the lessor under
the Leases prior to the effective date hereof;

b.

the discharge and performance of any duties and obligations to be performed or discharged by the lessor after
Closing if such duty or obligation arose prior to Closing
or is a continuing duty or obligation of Assignor by

glovieas^sg (dkp)
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reason of Assignor's failure to perform or discharge said
duty or obligation prior to Closing; or
c.

any matter arising from the breach of a representation,
warranty or covenant of Assignor under the Purchase
Agreement or for which Assignor is obligated to indemnify
Assignee under the Real Estate Sales Contract.

6.
Assignor acknowledges—thafe—Acoignce—shall—have—no
obligation t-e collect delinquent rentals attributable to the Leases
and unpaid as of the effective date hereof and in the event that
any such delinquent rentals attributable to the Leases are
collected the same shall be deemed the sole property of Apoignoc,»
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their
hands and seals the day and year first above written.
ASSIGNOR:
BROOKSIDE ASSOCIATES,
a Utah limited partnership
By its sole General Parnters, REC
corporation
Richard E. Chipman, Presic
President
[signatures continuing on next page]
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ASSIGNEE:
MARIE M. GLOVER and ALAN & BONNIE
GLOVER TRUST, a general partnership
comprised of the MARIE M. GLOVER
REVOCABLE TRUST dated Nov. 30, 1983
and the ALAN H. GLOVER & BONNIE A.
GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST dated Nov.
30, 1983
By one of its General partners,
MARIE M. GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST
dated Nov. 30, 1983
By

QM*,%4A<«*'

Alan H. Glover, Trustee

By Qrto
Bonne A. Glover, Trustee
And
by
its
remaining
General
Partner, ALAN H. GLOVER & BONNIE A.
GLOVER REVOCABLE TRUST dated Nov.
30, 1983

By _ C ^ "

*

Alan H. Glover, Trustee
By

q $ w J& itl/ste.
Bonne A. Glover, Trustee
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TOTALS

Roberts
Wilharcson
Hansen
Johnson
Bell
Blackwell
Chidester
Martinez
Jensen
Nelson
Gevry
Rees

195,.00
135 .00
.
19 5,. 00
195,.00
195,.00
195 .00
195,.00
195,.00
170,.00
195,.00
195,.00
195 .00

32,735.00

200,.00
200 .00
.00
200,.00
.00
55 ,
200 .00
2 00,.00
200,.00
.00
200,.00
100,
200,

29,215.00

5,348.00
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Samuel E. Peebles' check #4765 made payable to
and endorsed by Brookside.

SAMUEL B. PEEBLES 12 89
12668 SOUTH 2360 WEST
RIVERTON, UTAH 84065

H
H
M
M

4765

254-5010

31-1/1240
1881167918

H
M
Fir
HI 5
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FtrSt
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Appendice "D"
"Notice t o Pay Rent or Q u i t . "

NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR QUIT

TO: s&n p£E&Uf£

.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the rent on the premises located at BROOKSIDE
MOBILE HOME PARK, NO.
, which you now possess as a tenant, is past due.
You must, within three days after service of this Notice upon you, pay the
rent now due and owing on the premises, OR, in the alternative, you must, within
such period of three days, vacate the premises and deliver possession to your
landlord, BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, LTD., or its duly authorized agent. The
amount of rent now due ^ d p*M]g) for the months of kj£ffip^/3Z3L.
__, and
is $ ^?f' 3
together with late charges in the amount of
t^WDiO^
, and other fees and charges including pet fees of $
service
fees of * //>. n ft and
totaling $ ^ 7 ^ ^
In the event that you should cure the above default within the time period
allowed, but in the future at any time should default in the payment of rent when
due, violate any of the Rules and Regulations of Brookside Mobile Home Park, or
breach any provision of the Lease Agreement, such repeated default and/or violation will result in immediate termination of your lease without any further period to cure such default or violations and eviction proceedings will be initiated
immediately.
In the event of your failure to comply with the above Notice or to vacate
the premises within the specified period, you will be unlawfully detaining the
premises, and in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-36-10, Utah Code
Ann. (1953, as amended), you will be liable for treble damages for such unlawful
detainer, and an action will be commenced against you to evict you from the premises and to take judgment against you for the rent accrued and for three times
the damages assessed by the court for unlawful detainer, together with the costs
of legal action.
This Notice is given and served in accordance with the provisions of Section 57-16-5, Section 57-16-6, Section 78-36-3, and Section 78-36-6, Utah Code
Ann. (1953, as amended).
DATED

zhis

/ / day of pzcem&EZ . i$9£.
BROOKSIDE MOBILE HOM£_PARK,
a UtalTNLimited Pe

LTD.

Duly Authorized Agent
55 South Redwood Road
st Jordan, Utah 84084
Telephone (801) 561-5181
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Appendice E:
Brookside's ledger register indicating various
rent payments made to Brookside for lot #100.
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Appendice "F"
"Notice to Quit" from Brookside to Sam Peebles."

EXHIBIT
NOTICE TO QUIT
TO:

SAM PEEBLES
12067 SOUTH 2240 WEST
RIVERTON, UTAH 84065

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you must, within five (5) days after
service of this Notice upon you, remove the mobile home purportedly
owned by you from the premises located at 8155 South 1700 West, No.
100, West Jordan, Utah and deliver possession of said premises to
ics owner, Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd., or its duly authorized
agent. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. is the owner of said property pursuant to a purchase agreement dated August 22, 19 94.
In the event of your failure to comply with the above notice
to vacate the premises within the specified period, you will be
unlawfully detaining the premises, and in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-36-3, Utah Code Ann.
(1953), you will be
liable for treble damages for such unlawful detainer, and an action
will be commenced against you to evict you from the premises and to
take judgment against you for three times the damages assessed by
the Court for unlawful detainer, together with costs of legal
action.
This notice is given and served in accordance with the provisions of Sections 78-36-3 and 78-36-6, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended).
DATED this

//

day of April,

DENNIS K. POOLE
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Brookside Mobile
Home Park, Ltd.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
Telefax:
(801) 263-1010
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The teyns of anached Addendum ¥ _ / _ . . — are incorporated Into this Contract by this reference.
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10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Sellers warranties to Buyer regarding the condition of the Property are limited to the following
10.1 When seller deliver* possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings
10 2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixture* heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler
systems, appliances and fireplaces tn working order;
10 3 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller
10 4 Seller w.ll deliver possession of (he Property to Buyer with any private well or sept.c tank serving the Property m working order and in compliance
with governmental regulations;
10 5 Seller will ba responsible lor repairing any of Seller's moving*related damage to the Property,
10.6 Ai Closing, Seller w.ll br.ng current an financial obligations encumbering the Proporty which are assumed .n writing by Buyer and will discharge ail
such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed; and
10.7 As of Closing. Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Property which
has not been resolved
11. VERIFICATION CF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Before Closing. Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to
determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1,10 2,10 3 and 10 A are In the warranted condition and to verify .terns included in Section
1 1 are present on the Properly If any item . 5 not in the warranted condition, Seller will correct, repair or replace It as necessary or. with the consent 0 i
Buyer, escrow en amount at Closing to provide for such repair or replacement The Buyer's failure to conduci a "walk-through" Inspection or t 0 claim
during the walk-through" inspection mat the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1.1. or la not in the condition warranted in Section
10. shall not constitute a waiver I Buyer ol Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 or of the warranties contained In Section 10.
12. CHANGES DURING TR A N S A L HON. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall ba made, no new leases entered into, and no substantial
^iterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.
U AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Se: jr is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate ot other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf
warrants h., or hor authority to do so df\d to bind Buyer or Seller.
14. CO'ipu r E CONTRACT ihif instrument together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitute the entire Contract
between the parlies and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings *" contracts between the
panies. This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The pertier ^gree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the d>s(. v! or ol the Earnest
Monty Deposit, the breach or terminal
of this Contract, or the services relating to this transaction, shall first be submitted to meomiion m accordance
with the Utah Real Estate Buyer
.Ik 'ediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Disputes shall Include representations made by th«
partes
y Broker or other person nr en
»n connection with the sale, purchase, financing, condition or other aspect of the Property to which this Contract
pern,
nciuding withou4. limitation, allegations of concealment, misrepresentation, negligence and/or fraud Each party agrees to bear its own costs of
me • ..„0n. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding. If mediation fails, the procedures applicable and remedies
a> tn&ble under this Contract shall apply Nothing in this SeCjjOn \ 5 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation By
marking this box §^and adding their initials, the B u y e r f ^ j ^ - a o d the Seller (
). agree that mediation under this Section 15 Is not mandatory, but 15
optional upon agreement of all parties
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Setter may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money Deposit
and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights if Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may e«ect to either accept from Seller as
liquidated damages, a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit, or to sue Seller for specific performance end'or damages. If Buyer elects to accept th«
liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay tne liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy th«
panies intend that tne remedy shall he exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common taw.
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. <n any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall ba entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees
18. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The E$rn*$t Money DepotK shall not be rehased unless it is authorized by: (a) Section 2, Section 8.3 01 Section
15. (b} separate written agreement ot the parties; or (c) court order.
18. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing
20. RISK OF LG8S. All risk of loss Or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Extensions must be agreed to in writing by alt parties
Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date
22. FACSIMILE (FAX) OOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission,
shall be the same as delivery of an original U the transaction involves multiple Duyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may be executed in counterpa; '»
23. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an oHer or counteroffer of the other (a) signs the offer or counter where noted
to indicate acceptance, and (b) communicates to the other parry or the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the-Property on the above terms and conditions if Seller does not accept this ofier b>
. C AM C PM Mountain Time
_ . this offer shall lapse; and Hie Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money
Deposit to Bayer
t
/*"*
f

'
^
-^^C^a-fyN < r v

^
t

"%D&6t=^—-

(OHer Oate)

(6fter Oatl)
(Buyer's Signature)
^ ' 6"*^fh* above date shall be the OHer Reference Date.

(Notice Address)

(Phone)

(Notice Address)

(Phone)

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER
CHECK ONE:
D Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Notice Address)
(Notice Address)
D Rejection: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.
(Seller's Initials) (Dale)
(Time)
-QXounUr OHer: Seller presents for^&^er's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications as specified in the attached
/Counter Offer U _ /

-^r

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all * matures. (One of the following s'rematlves must therefore
be completed)
bearing a>htfwture'"" N
A
t
f
A. b f i acknowledge receiptt oy4jj?a\
ot^JWal copy
copy of
of the
the foregoing
foregoing Contract
(

~

~~

6StJ

~~—

B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be mailed on .,_..,.
certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller D Buyer, Sent by
Seller's Initials (

) Date

Buyer's Initials

Of£l*Y OfWRAl, JUNE, 1101
THIS roeU AP*«OV£l; Sr THE UTAH REAL CSTArt COMMISSION AND THE OFFlCS OF THF UTAH ATT
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

IgjiBBB
REALTOR*

Thi» l i • i»^tly binding Contnct Utah Stjrte urw requires that Notnsed reilMtateig*mtUMmU form but th« Buyci md tfM 4 n 4 i ,
, ^ n y ^ ^ , n WTtttng , 0 - h - f Qf ^ ^ p^Uloes of this lorm. If you desire legsi of tax edvk* consult your attorney or ft Mm it

f*£%
fce_e_l
"""°"*?

THIS SELLER FINANCINOADDENDUM (the "Addendum") la made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC ) with an Offer
Reference Data J ,feflf<?A~
\93&*between ^ ^ ^ / E , J2>. ^ r c T ^ ^ ^ Z ^ L - _ _
as Buyer
- ffl * ' f/
r*fi
nf^J* T*_^
aa Seller The terms ol this Addendum are
hereby mcorporaied as pan of ma R£Pf end 1o the extent these terms conflict with or modify any provisions of the RFPC 'he terms a* (his Adien j ,m
shall control AH other erms of the REPC not modified by this Addendum shall remain the same
and

1 CREDIT DOCUMENTS Seller s e/ienston of credit to Buyer ohall be evidenced by # Note and Doed of Tru6t L Note and All Inclusive Deed of Trust
r Other
^
2 CREDIT TERMS The larms of the credit documents referred to in Sectiop 1 above are as follows
^
S / ^ ^ft@ principal amount of the note (the "Note"), Interest at _ _ £ _ % per annum payable at approximately $ pW?'*-"
per
enure unpaid balance of principal plus accrued interest is due In
$1+
morths from date of the Note First payment due X&t^
Add'tir na principal payments balloon payments or other terms as follows
^^ *•

A4f)
The
/~" / * ? ? /
J / < , ^Q^

-^ & Ak^TtAJWl^lffi&iiZzfaijfy
The credit documents referenced in Section 1 of this Addendum will contain a due on-sale clause in favor o< Seller Buyer]?' wiliVwill not provide Seller
dt Closing witr
s title policy Insuring Seller In the amount of the Note Sailer agrees to provide to Buyer at Closing u) an amonliatlon schedule
- 1 on if * * d terms and (n) a written disclosure of the total Interest Buyer will pay to matunty of the Note
3 TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS in addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above, Buyer shall also be responsible tor (l) property ia*es < I,
nomeowr srs association dues (it ) special assessments, and (Iv) hazard insurance premiums on the Proporty These obligations will be patd ;><diractiy
to Set*- Fs^row Ageni on a monthly basis _ directly to the appMcabte county treasurer association and insurance company «® required by those ent ties
4 PAYMENT Buyer s payments under Secf/ona 2 and 3 above will be made to O Seller 5J(an Escrow Agent It an Escrow Agent
*"72> JPtr.-/J4m££)
. will act aa Escrow Agent §nd will be responsible for disbursing payments on the underlymg mortgage and in Ihe
Set •( ( r» ot setting up and m« ntaming ihe escrow account shall be paid by Q Buyer H Salla&slspllt evenly between the parties
5 LATF PAYMENT/PREPAYMENT Any payment not made withm
/ & days after it is due Is subject to a late charge ot $ /<£
or
Ald£t*°
ri Ir^e nslailrreni due Amounts in default ehall bear nterest at a rale of /^D **<. per annum All or part of tf e pnnc pal bianco on the Kioto ma^ ne
paid prior to matur ry without penalty
6 DUE-GN SALE This transaction i$ subject to Buyers approval of the terms of any underlying loan «is provided In Section 3 of the REPC Buyer
acknowledges that any undertymq loan on the Property may contain a due-on*sale clause which requires th«- ,n der s consent to this transaction If the
lender does not consent to this transaction and calls the loan immediately due Buyer agrees to discharge (S«, ndertyinrj loan as required by the lender
1 i f even' Seller s remaining equity shall h* paid as provided In the credit documents
7 BUYER 8 DISCLOSURES Buyer has provided to Seller as a required part of this Addendum the attached Buyer Financial Information Shaei •
PART B Buyer X w i l i f will not provide Seller w»lh copies of IRS returns for tho two preceding tax years Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contaf i
Buyer s current employur for v«ni»cHtion of employment as represented uy Buyer m the Uuyer Financial Information Sheet
a SLLLER APPROVAL Within the t me referenced in Section Tot the REPC, Buyer shall provide to Seder al Buyer s expanse a current c edit report
on Buyer from a consumer credit repomng agency Seller may use the information contained In the credit report and the information referenced n
Serf/on 7 of this Addondum (collectively referred to as Ihe "Buyer Disclosures*) lo evaluate Ihe credit worthiness of Buyer Seller agrees, to nwiniam
confidential all information contained m Ihe Buyer Disclosures
i 1 Seller Review W thin the lime period allowed In Section H 1 ol the HhPC Seller thali revtov"* the t edit report and the Buyai Disclosures to
determine it in Seller $ 6ole discretion the content of ihe credit report, and the Buyer Disclosures Is acceptable If the content ol the credit repon or the
Buytr Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller Seller may elect to either (I) provide written ob|ections to Buyer as provided in Section 8 2 of this
Addendum or (i) immediately void the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer within the time referenced in Section 8 1 of the RCPC Thp
Brokerage -upon receipt of a copy o' Seller a wrttten notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement ol
any further written authorization Irom Soller
8 2 Seller Objections If S^iiar anas nnt immBdlately void the REPC as provided above. Seller may within the time penod allowed in Section 8 f of ihe
REPC provide buyer with written objections Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar days after Buyers receipt of the objections to resolve Sellers
obieciions Buyer ma/ put shall not be required to resolve Seller s objections If Seller s objections are not resolved within the seven calendar days Seller
may void 'he REPC by providing written notice to Buyer within the same seven calendar days The Brokerage upon recelot of a copy of Sella's written
not rp nf ran^piiation shall return »o Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the iequipment of any further written authorization from Seller
8 3 Failure to Object if Seller does not deliver a written objection to Buyer regarding the credit repon or a Buyer Disclosure within the lime p nod
a lowed m Section 8 1 of the REPC or if Seller does not void the REPC as provided in Sections 8 lot 8 2 of this Addendum any objections to the * red«
rypon and Buyer Disclosures will be daamad approy^c^waivedby Seller
/
Z Seller ""• Buver shall have until _ _ _ 2 L L J A . M U P M. MourtuwfTime „
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to accept these terms in a t ordance with Section t j

#3 q<
C Buyer O Seller Signature

Date
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTIOI^OUNTER OFFER

UHE< K ONF

;*2. 'CCEPTANCE

~ Seller P B p f ^ r w e o y accepts thestj terms

?_____.
Date

rjale

fTiuyer D Seller Signature

r

C REJECTION n Seller i J Buyer rejects these terrr
(Initials)

(Uau*»

Tlma

(r,m0)

C COUNTER OFFER Z Seller r" Buyer presents as a counter ofter the terms set forth on the attached Counter Offer •

'm*

.

/ \sssvi* i t n v r r c n ff _ ,

TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

This is an ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date
, including all addenda and counter offers,,
between , .>(% f ds r * Jh^ . L< /A+£7!&* Cf^^CS
a s Buyer,
and > ^ ^ ^ ^ r ^ i ^ £
-f/*C<£&<><'
', as Seller'
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the
REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same

(3T fi^^udiA^ To X - ^ c j 7Jbed? t^cy***^

S>)

j ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ ' Z ^

U^yt^^n^^

AC*J£JA^<

X^t^>c^i^^Jl^

^'^T^l<^j

fQrtjPjuu^f

(1 * i * ^

V<u

( ] Seller ( J Buyer shall have until^LL[ 1 A M { ] P M Mountain Time,
these termsM accordancajwith- Section 23 of the REPC Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse

[ I Buyer X_>eller Signature

Date

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

Date

, 19

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER
CHECK ONE
f J Acceptance f J Seller ( J Buyer hereby accepts these terms.

{ ] Buyer ( ] Seller Signature

Date

( ) Buyer [ J Seller Signature

Date

Time

Time

( 1 Rejection ( ] Sellei ( ] Buyer rejects these terms
(Initials)

(Date)

(Time)

[ ] Counter Offer [ ] Seller ( ] Buyer presents as a counter offer the terms set forth on the attached Counter Offer # .

, to accept

Appendicr UH
Jury's response to questions raised at t r i a l .

INTERROGATOR! i

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that prior to J3I ii id! v A 199'
when Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. acquired the Park, that Defei claiii i t: Sc
Peebles had a written, lease or rental agreement with the Park for the lease --i
Space too. 100?
Yes

No

If your answer to Question A above is "Yes/" please answer Question B
answer to Question A is "No " go to Interrogatory III,
B.

Do you find by e preponderance of the evidence that Sam, Peebles' lease or
rental agreement was surrendered?"
No

^

If your answer to Question B above is "Yes/" go to Interrogatoi\r III
to Qi lestion B is "No," please answer Question C.
C.

If yoi ir

If your answer

Do you find by a preponderance ol the evidence that Brookside Mobile Home
Pai k 1 td assumed Sam Peebles'' tease or rental agreement?
Yes

No

v

^_

Please proceed to Interrogatory No. II.

Jury For

INTERROGATORY II

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Brookside Mobile Home
Park, Ltd unreasonably withheld approval of one or more prospective purchasers
of Sam Peebles' mobile home, to become a resident in the Park?
Yes

No

If your answer to QuestiorO^above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory W.
your answer to Question^^bove is "Yes," please answer Question B below.

If

A
B.

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Brookside's withholding
of approval of one or more of the prospective purchasers of Sam Peebles'
mobile home to become a resident in the Park was the cause of any damage or
injury to Sam Peebles?
Yes

No

If your answer to Question C above is "Yes," please proceed to Interrogatory^?. If
your answer to Question C above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory III.
Dated this

day of October, 1998.

/\s\ \

IN i t h R u G A i u h Y III

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Brookside Mobile Home
Park, Ltd. unreasonably withheld its consent to one or more prospective
purchasers of Sam Peebles' mobile home, to become a resident in the Park?
Yes

No

\

If your answv. ^ Question A above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory IV. if
your answer to Question A above is "Yes," please answer Question B below.
B.

. Do you fir id by a preponderance of ti ie e\ idence that Brookside Mobile Home
Park, Ltd intentionally interfered witl i Sain Peebles' prospective economic
relations by disapproving the prospective purchasers of Sam Peebles' mobile
home, as a resident in the Pai k?
Yes

No

If your answer to Question B above is "Yes/" please answer Question C below
answer to Question B above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory IV.

If yo«w

Do you find by a prepowloi "K,u n! the evidence that Brookside Mobile Humr
Park, Ltd's intentional interference with Sam Peebles' prospective economic
relations was for an improper purpose or by improper means?
Yes

No

If your answer to Question C above is "Y es," please answer Question U bd
your answer to Question C above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory IV
P

"

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Brookside Mobile Home
Park, Ltd's interference with Sam Peebles' prospective economic relations was
the cause of any damage or injury to Defendant Sam Peebles?
Yes

No

If • 11
, i :iur answer to Question D above is "Yes," please proceed to InterrogatoryIV
y : i iiir answer to Question D above is "No," please proceed to Interrogatory \\ f

